国际财务管理（原书第8版）课件PPTEun_CH04_Accessible.pptx

International Financial ManagementEighth Edition;Chapter Outline;Governance and the Public Corporation: Key Issues (1 of 3);Governance and the Public Corporation: Key Issues (2 of 3);Governance and the Public Corporation: Key Issues (3 of 3);The Agency Problem (1 of 2);The Agency Problem (2 of 2);The Agency Problem at Enron (1 of 3);The Agency Problem at Enron (2 of 3);The Agency Problem at Enron (3 of 3);Remedies for the Agency Problem;Corporate Boards: Germany;Corporate Boards: England;Corporate Boards: Japan;Incentive Contracts;Concentrated Ownership;EXHIBIT 4.1: The Alignment versus Entrenchment Effects of Managerial Ownership;EXHIBIT 4.2 Classification of Countries by Legal Origins: English Common Law (1 of 2);EXHIBIT 4.2 Classification of Countries by Legal Origins: English Common Law (2 of 2);EXHIBIT 4.2 Classification of Countries by Legal Origins: French Civil Law (1 of 2);EXHIBIT 4.2 Classification of Countries by Legal Origins: French Civil Law (2 of 2);EXHIBIT 4.2 Classification of Countries by Legal Origins: German Civil Law;EXHIBIT 4.2 Classification of Countries by Legal Origins: Scandinavian Civil Law;Differences in Legal Protection of Investors;Law and Corporate Governance;Consequences of Law;EXHIBIT 4.4 Consequences of Law: Ownership and Capital Markets: English Common Law (1 of 2);EXHIBIT 4.4 Consequences of Law: Ownership and Capital Markets: English Common Law (2 of 2);EXHIBIT 4.4 Consequences of Law: Ownership and Capital Markets: French Civil Law (1 of 2);EXHIBIT 4.4 Consequences of Law: Ownership and Capital Markets: French Civil Law (2 of 2);EXHIBIT 4.4 Consequences of Law: Ownership and Capital Markets: German Civil Law;EXHIBIT 4.4 Consequences of Law: Ownership and Capital Markets: Scandanavian Civil Law;Consequences of Law: Italy versus the United Kingdom (1 of 2);Consequences of Law: Italy versus the United Kingdom (2 of 2);Ownership and Control;Capital Markets and Valuation;Economic Growth;Pyramidal Ownership Structure (1 of 2);Pyramid