透明度与公司治理毕业外文翻译.docx

Transparency and Corporate Governance MaterialSource: HYPERLINK /units/am/pdf/HWTransparencyJan2007.pdf /units/am/pdf/HWTransparencyJan2007.pdf Author: Benjamin Hamelin Abstract An objective of many proposed corporate governance reforms is in creased transparency. This goal has been relatively uncontroversial, as most observers believe increased transparency to be unambiguously good. We argue that, from a corporate governance perspective, there are likely to be both costs and benefits to increased transparency, leading to an optimum level beyond which increasing transparency lowers profits. This result holds even when there is no direct cost of increasing transparency and no issue of revealing information to regulators or product-market rivals. We show that reforms that seek to increase transparency can reduce firm profits, raise executive compensation, and inefficiently increase the rate of CEO turnover. We further consider the possibility that executives will take actions to distort information. We show that executives could have incentives, due to career concerns, to increase transparency and that increases in penalties for distorting information can be profit reducing. Introductions In response to recent corporate governance scandals, governments have responded by adopted a number of regulatory changes. One component of these changes has been increased disclosure requirements. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley(sox), adopted in response to Enron, WorldCom, and other public governance failures, required detailed reporting of off-balance sheet financing and special purpose entities. Additionally, sox increased the penalties to executives for misreporting. The link between governance and transparency is clear in the public^ (and regulators9) perceptions; transparency was increased for the purpose of improving governance. Yet, most academic discussions about transparency have nothing to do with coiporate governance? The most commonly discussed benefit of transparency is t