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监督激励和管理:特定领域机会主义行为的决定.pdf
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
MONITORING, MOTIVATION AND MANAGEMENT:
THE DETERMINANTS OF OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR IN A FIELD EXPERIMENT
Daniel Nagin
James Rebitzer
Seth Sanders
Lowell Taylor
Working Paper 8811
/papers/w8811
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
March 2002
We would like to thank the following people for helpful advice and criticism: Dan Black; John Bound,
Robert Frank, Dan Hammermesh, Ed Lazear, and Yoram Weiss. We also benefited from comments received
during presentations at: the Society for Labor Economists meetings, the NBER Summer Institute, Case
Western Reserve Universitys Markets, Organizations and Public Policy seminar , and Princeton Universitys
Industrial Relations seminar. Laura Leete graciously provided the census extracts we use in our analysis. The
views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
© 2002 by Daniel Nagin, James Rebitzer, Seth Sanders and Lowell Taylor. All rights reserved. Short
sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
Monitoring, Motivation and Management: The Determinants of
Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment
Daniel Nagin, James Rebitzer, Seth Sanders and Lowell Taylor
NBER Working Paper No. 8811
March 2002
JEL No. D2, J2, L2, L8, M12
AB
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