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4.使用迴歸 CAR=a+1.37EBC+ (c)managerial stock ownership+(d) ownership of previously granted +(f) options+ time and industry + e—高成長機會公司 CAR=c+0.97EBC+()+e ---低成長機會公司 (t=2.04/2.38)關係皆不顯著 ---1.EBC不是影響宣告日的CAR的唯一因素 2.高成長機會公司，EBC較有影響力 3.非因主併者成長機會高而使EBC高 Next one~ Executive Compensation and CorporateAcquisition DecisionsSUDIP DATTA, MAI ISKANDAR-DATTA, and KARTIK RAMAN 姓名:蕭詩穎 課程:財務管理專題研討 P2299 摘要 併購對公司而言是重大的長期投資，且是可被外界觀察到的 經由併購的過程可能加重經理人和投資人間的利益衝突(經理人不是因為能極大化股東財富進行併購而純粹是自利因素) ( mergers and acquisitions are major, externally observable, and discretionary long-term investments. These transactions also present managers with opportunities that can exacerbate the potential for conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.) 假設經理人的報償契約(Executive compensation contracts) 可用來使經理人依股東的利益行事 財務學家認為經理人的報償結構會影響公司進行接收活動的決策 (Executive compensation contracts can be used to effectively align managerial interests with those of shareholders, and financial economists have recognized the potential influence of managerial compensation on corporate takeover decisions) P2300 先期研究: 報償結構和公司的縮減(清算、脫產)有關 研究主題: 經理人的報償結構如何影響經理人的投資決策 (examine how executive compensation determines managerial investment decisions) 1.主併公司在併購前的報償結構可否解釋主併者宣布併購案時所產生的股價反映 (先前無人探討) (whether the insignificant or negative announcement stock price response for bidding firms can be explained by acquiring managers’ compensation structure prior to the acquisition) 2.併購時付給被併者的溢價金和主併公司的報償結構(借代為經理人會依照股東利益行事的程度)的關係 (investigate the relation between the acquisition premium and the extent to which the interests of acquiring managers, measured by their compensation structure, are aligned with those of shareholders.) 3.用經理人的報償結構來衡量併購案的風險程度(被併者的成長機會、主併公司股票報酬的變異數的變化) (managerial compensation in acquiring firms is similarly linked to measures