PaulR.Goldin.PDF

Persistent Misconceptions about Chinese “Legalism” Paul R. Goldin The reasons for avoiding the term “legalism” in the study of classical Chinese philosophy were summarized years ago by Herrlee G. Creel,1 and most scholars would probably agree, if pressed, that the term is flawed, and yet one continues to find it deployed in published books and articles—almost as though no one is prepared to admit that it has to be abandoned.2 I believe that “legalism” is virtually useless as a hermeneutic lens; indeed, in many contexts it obscures more than it clarifies. Even as a bibliographical category, as it was frequently used in imperial times, its value is questionable. In the following pages, I shall first review the weaknesses of the term “legalism,” then ask why scholars persist in adopting it even though they can hardly be unaware of its defects, and finally suggest a better approach to the material that is conventionally categorized as “legalist.” * * * “Legalism” is an imprecise Sinological translation of the Chinese termfajia 法家. 1 “Thefa-chia : ‘Legalists’ or ‘Administrators’?” (1961), reprinted in Creel’s What Is Taoism? and Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 92-120. It should be noted that in his earlier publications, such as Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), Creel seemed comfortable with the term. 2 Lest readers suppose that I am arguing against a straw man, consider the following titles, published just since 2000, using the term “Legalism” (or some cognate): Roger Boesche, “Han Feizi’s Legalism versus Kautilya’s Arthashastra ,” Asian Philosophy 15.2 (2005), 157-72; idem, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra and the Legalism of Lord Shang,” Journal of Asia